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TL;DR
Trezor confirmed that three Safe 5 wallets bought through former reseller CryptoBilis contained an extra circuit board that copied recovery words shown on the device and sent them over a mobile network. Firmware 2.13.1, released November 11, blocks the implants Trezor has identified, but cannot protect recovery information captured before installation. Trezor says no owners of the three confirmed devices have reported losing funds.
Trezor has confirmed implants in three Safe 5 hardware wallets bought through former reseller CryptoBilis, saying the added circuit boards could copy recovery words and passphrases displayed on the devices and transmit them over a mobile network. The company says firmware 2.13.1 blocks the implants it has identified, but cannot protect wallet information captured before the update was installed; no owner of the three confirmed devices has reported losing funds.
Trezor said on November 12 that its laboratory examined one Safe 5 reported by a customer and identified two additional implanted devices from photographs sent by their owners. The three wallets were bought between August 20 and September 23, 2026, through CryptoBilis’s Tokopedia and Shopee stores or directly from the reseller. They are three individual devices of the Safe 5 model, not three different Trezor models.
According to Trezor’s analysis, the implant is an extra circuit board fitted between the device’s main board and screen. It copies information displayed there, including recovery words when a wallet is backed up or restored, and a passphrase if one appears. Trezor says the implant encrypts captured data and sends it to an attacker-controlled server over a mobile network; if it cannot connect, it retains the data and retries later.
Trezor says the implant does not alter the wallet’s firmware or its Secure Element, a dedicated security chip. The company released firmware 2.13.1 on November 11 for the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T. It says the update stops the implants it has found from capturing data on devices running the new firmware. The company also says no customer has reported losing funds in connection with the three confirmed Safe 5s. Forty-eight CryptoBilis customers have come forward, and Trezor says their devices are being checked.
Trezor Safe 5 implant · how it works
What the hidden board copies, and what the fix stops
How Trezor describes the implant it found in three Safe 5 wallets bought from CryptoBilis, and what firmware 2.13.1 changes.
Inside the device (schematic)
mobile network
Step by step
- 1Recovery words appear on the screen, when a wallet backup is created or a wallet is restored
- 2The extra board copies them, and a passphrase if one is shown. Firmware and Secure Element stay unchanged
- 3It encrypts the data and sends it over the mobile network. No connection: it keeps the data and retries
- 4Firmware 2.13.1, released Nov 11: stops the implants found so far from capturing anything
Confirmed
3 Safe 5 devices, bought Aug 20 – Sep 23, 2026 from CryptoBilis
Being checked
48 CryptoBilis buyers came forward; no tampering found at other resellers in the region
Funds lost
None reported so far, Trezor says
Source: Trezor, “Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we’ve changed”, Nov 12, 2026; Trezor firmware changelog (2.13.1, released Nov 11, 2026). Schematic drawing, not the real board layout.
Graphic: Powered by Thorsten Meyer AI
Recovery Words Are the Exposure
The reported implant targets information that can give someone control of a wallet: its recovery words, and potentially a passphrase. If those details were captured and reached the attackers, a firmware update applied afterward would not undo that exposure. Trezor’s warning is specific: the update cannot protect a backup captured before it.
The case also highlights a supply-chain risk distinct from a software flaw. Trezor says the implant sits between the screen and the main board, while leaving the firmware and security chip unchanged. That means checking those components alone would not establish whether a device had been physically altered. This is an implication of the company’s description, not a separate finding Trezor has reported.
For customers, the confirmed number remains limited to three devices, while checks of other customer wallets are ongoing. Trezor says every other device it has checked showed no evidence of tampering, and its checks of devices from other resellers in the region found none. Those findings describe the devices examined so far; they do not establish the condition of every wallet sold through the former reseller.
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From Reseller Warning to Lab Finding
The case emerged amid a separate investigation involving CryptoBilis. Trezor says Ledger began investigating customer fund losses linked to wallets bought from the company on October 9. Ledger, which had authorized CryptoBilis as a reseller, later confirmed physical tampering in some devices. In an October 15 statement, Ledger described it as “an attack on the distribution channel after the devices left our control.” CryptoBilis was also an authorized Trezor reseller at the time, and Trezor says it removed the company from its network on October 9.
On October 28, a Trezor customer in Indonesia reported an extra circuit board inside a Safe 5 bought from CryptoBilis through Tokopedia. Trezor had not yet examined that device, but issued a customer warning on October 30. The company said it acted before laboratory confirmation because it did not want CryptoBilis buyers to remain exposed while it investigated. The lab confirmation and identification of two other devices followed on November 12.
Trezor says the implant operates similarly to those found in Ledger devices, adapted to the Safe 5’s display. It is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance’s emergency response service, and says it has cut its reseller network by about 80%. The source material does not specify the date or method of that reduction.
“It only listens.”
— Trezor
Checks Continue Beyond Three Devices
The confirmed finding covers three Safe 5 devices; it does not establish how many other devices may have been affected. Trezor says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward and their wallets are being checked, but it has not reported the results for that full group. It also has not said whether the three confirmed devices represent all implanted units sold through the reseller.
The company has not reported customer losses among the owners of the three confirmed wallets. It is not clear whether any recovery words or passphrases captured by the implants were successfully received or used by the attackers. The source material also does not give details of the server, the attackers’ identities, or whether authorities are investigating.
Trezor’s statement that other examined devices showed no evidence of tampering is limited to the wallets it checked. No independent findings or detailed testing method are included in the source material. The extent of exposure before firmware 2.13.1, and whether any previously captured data exists, therefore remains unknown.
Customer Checks and Firmware Updates
Trezor says it is checking devices belonging to customers who have come forward and is working with SEAL 911. Its next public update would be expected to clarify how many of the 48 reported customers have had their devices examined and whether further implants were found; the company has not provided a timetable in the material available.
Owners of the Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T can install firmware 2.13.1, which Trezor says blocks the identified implants from capturing information on updated devices. That protection applies to future capture by the implants Trezor found, not to information that may have been recorded beforehand. Trezor’s published account directs concern toward where a device was purchased, but the source material does not provide an independent test customers can use to rule out physical tampering.
The investigation’s scope will depend on the remaining device checks and any further findings from Trezor or its response partners. Until those results are reported, the number of affected wallets and the status of any information potentially taken from them remain unresolved.
Key Questions
What did Trezor find inside the Safe 5 wallets?
Trezor confirmed an extra circuit board between the main board and screen in three Safe 5 devices. It says the board copied information displayed on the screen, including recovery words and, if shown, a passphrase.
Does firmware 2.13.1 remove the implant?
Trezor says firmware 2.13.1 stops the implants it has identified from capturing information on devices running the update. The source material does not say that installing the update physically removes the extra board.
Can the update protect recovery words already captured?
No. Trezor says the update cannot protect a backup captured before installation. The company has not said whether information taken from the three confirmed wallets was successfully received or used.
How many customers have reported devices for checking?
Trezor says 48 CryptoBilis customers have come forward and that their devices are being checked. The number of additional implanted devices, if any, has not been established.
Have owners of the three confirmed wallets lost funds?
Trezor says none of the owners of the three confirmed Safe 5 devices has reported losing funds. That statement covers the confirmed devices and does not resolve whether data captured by the implants could be used later.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
